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MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS OF THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA

______________________________________________________________________________
ISSUE:

DOES POLITICAL PRESSURE NECESSARILY AMOUNT TO POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ALLEVIATE WORRIES THAT POLITICAL
PRESSURE AMOUNTS TO POLITICAL INTERFERENCE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS

______________________________________________________________________________

Prepared by Alexis Lee Krivoshik
J.D. Candidate, May 2016
Fall Semester, 2014
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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Issue and Question
The Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) asked the War Crimes

Prosecution Lab at Case Western Reserve School of Law, to examine the question: does political
pressure on judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers necessarily amount to political interference
in a fair trial process?1 I have been asked to identify various cases and situations that have
examined the effects or lack thereof of political pressure on the processes of international law.
The ECCC has been the object of much criticism when it comes to the involvement of the
Cambodian government. Public statements from Prime Minister Hun Sen about the quantity of
prosecutions that should be undertaken, circumstances surrounding Cases 003 and 004, and the
formation of the tribunal itself have all been highly publicized and criticized by the international
community.
This memorandum states that even in cases where the government holds sway in the
processes of the judicial system, the trials themselves can be fair. A fair trial is a guarantee under
international human rights law; additionally a fair trial increases the legitimacy of a court. Legal
systems around the world generally acknowledge that the accused in a criminal case have a right
to a fair trial, which in part consists of an impartial judiciary.2
a. Summary of Conclusions
There is scarce authority on the definitions of political pressure and political interference,
especially in the international sphere. Courts all mention the importance of an impartial judiciary
1

Does political pressure on judges, prosecutors and / or defense lawyers necessarily amount to political interference
in a fair trial process? Please provide as many examples as possible where judicial authorities have held that political
pressure does not necessarily amount to breach of an accused's fair trial rights to an independent and impartial trier
of fact.
2

For the purposes of this memo the judiciary is defined as: prosecutors, defense, and judges.

7

and concur that political interference is bad; however no documents define what those things
mean. Therefore part of this memorandum will propose working definitions for “political
pressure” and “political interference3.”
The Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) office of the Prosecutor
has asked that this paper examine cases in which political pressure was extant but did not amount
to political interference. International law has long been battling the looming presence of
political pressure and interference. High profile international cases ranging from that of Charles
Taylor to that of Rios Montt, in which there have been allegations of political interference both
in the proceedings and the structures of the various tribunals, have been upheld as fair.
Furthermore, other cases have pointed out that an appeals mechanism or a reevaluation of a case
can mitigate possible unfairness that might be caused by political interference. Mechanisms
meant to prevent political pressure from amounting to political interference, could also be useful
for the ECCC’s situation.
Since the ECCC posed this question, an analysis of the Chambers will be helpful in
discussing whether or not political entities hold sway in the Chambers. The United Nations
(UN) and Cambodia have been trying to balance their interests, making the formation of the
ECCC contentious. The formation of the ECCC incorporated various internal mechanisms to
alleviate the possibility of unfair proceedings, due to ideologies of the appointed judges,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers. Political pressure on the judiciary system does not mean that
the pressure interferes with the outcomes of the trials4. The internal rules of the court call for the
utilization of international standards in the processes of the court; furthermore the Internal Rules
3

For definitions and discussion see, Section III(A)

4

For definitions and discussion see, Section III(A)
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of the ECCC state that the judiciary may not accept or seek any instructions from any source,
including the government, other than the rules of the ECCC. The ECCC has mechanisms that
were negotiated into the system by the United Nations and Cambodia to combat the possibility
that political pressure could become political interference.
Finally this memorandum will explore possible policy considerations that speak both for
and against the importance of political pressure. The final section will explore political pressure
in international law and the possibility that the system might not function at all without political
pressure. This analysis will be useful to the ECCC, in cases where some members of the
international community suggest that all political pressure must be eradicated.
This memo concludes that just because there is political pressure, such pressure need not
always lead to political interference. This paper will use cases to outline that idea, and will also
point to mechanisms built into the ECCC which function to prevent political pressure from
becoming political interference.
II.

Factual Background
A. History of the Khmer Rouge:
From 1975 until 1979 the Communist Party of Kampuchea, colloquially known as the

Khmer Rouge, held power in Cambodia. The Cambodian people endured an incredible amount
of suffering during this time period because of the policies of the Khmer Rouge. These policies
included the use of forced labor camps and the eradication of small villages thought to be
harboring enemies of the Khmer Rouge. In January 1979 a Vietnamese army freed Cambodia
from the Khmer Rouge; the Vietnamese then occupied Cambodia until 1989. The numbers are
unclear but loss of life during the Khmer Rouge period is estimated between 7.3 to 7.9 million
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people.5
B. Formation of the ECCC
The ECCC was formed by a series of negotiations spanning from 1997 to 2003 between
the UN and Cambodia, since “neither the Cambodian Government nor the UN Secretariat trusted
the other side to run the process. Both sides had ample historical reasons to be suspicious of one
another.”6 Because Cambodia did not have the resources or experience to create a new court,
they had to rely upon the UN. Furthermore, because of the mutual distrust between the UN and
Cambodia, many sources have published an analysis of that tension. In the book Hybrid Justice:
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, John Corciari and Ann Heindel
explain:
UN participation was intended to ensure that the ECCC would meet international standards, but where the
United Nations is unable or unwilling to fight for those standards, a hybrid court is left to the mercy of
national interests.7

While the ECCC’s situation is not as dire as this quotation makes it out to be, nevertheless this
comment effectively indicates the nature of the tension between the government of Cambodia
and the UN. The negotiation process was complicated, with the basic structure of the court
central to the question; the final product was a hybrid tribunal.
C. Structure of the ECCC
The ECCC is comprised of three judicial chambers, the office of the co-investigating
judges, the office of the co-prosecutors, and an administrative office which oversees the defense
5

Susanna Linton, at 95-6. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 13] Citing: Report
of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to UNGA Res. 52/135, transmitted by the SecretaryGeneral along with his own report, UN Doc. A/53/850, S/199/231. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 6]
6

John D. Ciorciari & Ann Heindel, at 15. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 21]

7

Id. at 201.
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and victim support.8 In this memorandum, the three judicial chambers and the offices of the coprosecutors and co-investigating judges, are of particular interest.
D. Allegations of Political Pressure Upon the Judiciary of the ECCC
The ECCC’s efforts to find justice for victims and survivors of the Cambodian genocide
have also been tainted by coverage by the media and legal scholars. Scholars have pointed out
that: “Accountability efforts for the Cambodian genocide have fallen victim to a process in
which peace was prioritized over justice, and national interest (on the part of Cambodia and an
array of international actors) was prioritized over both.” 9 In recognition of the danger that this
would happen, the ECCC was created with various internal mechanisms to combat the political
pressure and possible corruption of the judiciary within the ECCC itself.
III. Substantive Legal Discussion
A. Definitions
1. Political Pressure
For the purposes of this memo, “political pressure” is the power exerted by political
actors; in the international sphere this includes but is not limited to States, collections of States,
and non-governmental organizations. Political pressure is difficult to define, however the
simplest and most encompassing way to describe it would be the exertion of persuasive efforts
by those in power. If the government of one state wants a particular outcome and makes that
known, this would constitute political pressure for purposes of this memo. Political pressure can
vary from light to intense. Intense political pressure, of course, has the highest likelihood of
8

The three chambers are: Pre-trial Chamber, Trial Chamber, and Supreme Court. See Agreement Between the
United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (Jun. 6, 2003), I-41723 UNT.S. 2329 [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2]
9

Kristen Ainley, at 26. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 22]

11

resulting in political interference.
Political pressure can be seen as necessary for the application and formation of
international law, because without it international courts would have no authority. Without the
authority provided by the backing of political entities, the international courts would lack the
ability to enforce their judgments, because unlike States, international courts do not have
autonomy, or an enforcement body.
2. Political Interference
For the purposes of this memo, “political interference” results when political pressure
brings about a change in the outcome of a particular situation. It is very difficult to find a brightline distinction where “pressure” morphs into “interference.”
3. Judiciary
For the means of this memorandum, the judiciary is a term used to refer to the people that
make up the court; with particular emphasis upon the judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers.
B. Discussion of Particular Cases and Historical Development of International Courts
The establishment of the International Criminal Court and various cases demonstrate that
political pressure upon the processes of the court does not necessarily lead to “interference” in
the sense of directly affecting the outcomes of trials. And where it has done so, there are various
mechanisms intended to counteract such interference.
1. States Are Allowed to Decide What Laws and Procedures are Applicable in
Their Tribunals
In his article “Assessing the Impact of the United Nations War Crimes Commission on
the Principle of Complementarity and Fair Trial Standards” Prof. Mark S. Ellis discusses the
formation of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) and its role in creating fair

12

trial standards during the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the
subsequent policy decisions that led to the establishment of various tribunals:
It is interesting to note that the responsibilities of the Commission extended only to war
criminals and not to those individuals who committed atrocities against nationals of their
own country. This exception aimed to ensure that the Commission did not interfere with a
nation and its own citizens and sought to protect a State’s right to punish its own
nationals….[T]he Commission went even further and noted that the national courts
should decide what laws and what procedure were applicable.10
The UNWCC, in its establishment of the ICC, sought to assist the States parties in establishing a
fair trial process, not to dictate to them what was allowable. Based upon the principles of the
UNWCC the applicable laws and procedures of the ECCC should be determined by the ECCC
and the Cambodian government. Furthermore political pressure upon which processes and
procedures are applicable in the court, can be mitigated through various mechanisms, as outlined
in the following cases.
2. Intense Political Pressure Alone Cannot Stop a Trial
Rios Montt was the President of Guatemala during the Guatemalan Civil War, from 1982
until 1983. Global spectators and Spain accused his regime of genocide and crimes against
humanity, due to the targeting of the indigenous Maya population during the purge of the
guerrilla movement in Guatemala11.
President Otto Perez Molina maintained throughout the Rios Montt trial that genocide
never happened in Guatemala, in part because Molina was a regional commander12 during the
Montt regime. Molina’s public statements arguably amounted to political pressure upon the

10

Mark S. Ellis, at 200. Emphasis added. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 8]

“Justice on Trial in Guatemala: The Ríos Montt Case - International Crisis Group”, at 2. [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 16]
11

12

Guatemala City & Bogota & Brussels, Justice on Trial in Guatemala: The Rios Montt Case, Latin America
Report 5023 (2013). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 12]
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proceedings themselves, because they were statements made by the President of a nation about
the very situation that necessitated the trial in question. However, Molina allowed the judiciary
to act as a separate power during his presidency. Molina did not appoint judges or meddle with
the court’s internal affairs. Even with the statements made by the Sitting President of Guatemala,
Molina, Montt was originally convicted on May 10, 2013. While his conviction has been
overturned on other grounds by the Constitutional Court of Guatemala, the trial will resume in
January 2015.13 Molina’s statements could be construed as political pressure, however with the
conviction Montt’s trial demonstrates that political pressure does not necessarily equate to
political interference. 14 Even though the trial was overturned, the Constitutional Court did not
cite political reasons, including the statements of Molina as the reason for overturning the guilty
verdict. Rather, the Court noted that when Montt’s lawyers walked out Montt was left without
representation, which was illegal according to Guatemalan Law.15 Thus in this case the trial was
still allowed to go forward even under intense political pressure, and was overturned only
because of a problem with the proceedings themselves.
3. Political Pressure Fails to Stop Otherwise Meritorious Claims

“Justice on Trial in Guatemala: The Ríos Montt Case - International Crisis Group”, at 2. [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 16]
13

14

Will Grant BBC, and Guatemala City, at 1. See also Guatemala City & Bogota & Brussels, Justice on Trial in
Guatemala: The Rios Montt Case, Latin America Report 5023 (2013). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source 15]
15

Defense lawyers were upset about a legal technicality, as a last ditch effort to suspend the trial they walked out,
leaving Montt without representation. The lawyers were upset that the judge who had ordered the trial presided over
pre-trial hearings. However the court decided that as long as the closing statements are redone then the trial is still
valid. Rios Montt’s Lawyers Walk Out of Guatemala Genocide Trial.VOA. (Retrieved 17 Nov
2014).http://www.voanews.com/content/rios-montts-lawyers-walk-out-of-guatemala-genocide-trial/1644482.html.
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 20] See also Guatemala City & Bogota &
Brussels, Justice on Trial in Guatemala: The Rios Montt Case, Latin America Report 5023 (2013). [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 12]
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As a result of his involvement in the Sierra Leone Civil War,16 Charles Taylor the
President of Liberia, was accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Charles Taylor
allegedly created and supported the rebel groups which during the Sierra Leone Civil War
committed various crimes against humanity including the use of child soldiers. He was indicted
in 2003.
Charles Taylor has alleged that his trial was a conspiracy of foreign nations to convict
him and was thus unfair.17 The Appeals Chamber at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, however,
upheld his conviction and his sentence.
The judges agreed that Taylor’s assessment of his trial as a conspiracy, was wrong.18 The
judges used their skills of deduction and reasoning to determine that Taylor’s interpretation, that
his trial was simply a conspiracy by foreign powers, was unfounded. While there may have been
political pressure to prosecute Taylor and funding from the UN to run the trial, according to the
Appeals Chamber Taylor was convicted based upon the evidence of war crimes presented, not
the assertion of the countries. The judges of the Charles Taylor trial examined the evidence and
found him guilty because of the evidence, not because foreign countries told the court that he
was guilty. No documents from the trial mention political interference however they do mention
the presence of the evidence, on which Taylor was found guilty. Thus the court asserts that
Taylor was found guilty on the merits of his case and not because of some western conspiracy.
4. Impartiality must be Measured both Subjectively and Objectively and May be
Remedied with Appeals Mechanisms
16

1991-2002. See Sierra Leone profile. BBC News. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419
(Accessed November 17, 2014). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 23]
17
“Charles Taylor’s Conviction and Sentence Upheld: What next for Him?” at 1. [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 18]
“At Prosecution and Defense Oral Arguments on Sentencing, Charles Taylor Makes Public Statement” at 1.
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 17]
18
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This case rested on a procedural question. It decided whether or not a judge who objected
to a decision, may decide on that objection. The original case was about Klaziena Wilhelmina de
Haan, a woman who was ill due to the chemicals she used in her job at a dry cleaners. Under the
Netherland’s Health Insurance Act she was entitled to sick-pay; however after a year of sick-pay
the government cut her off. During her trial, a judge who objected to evidence presented, ruled
upon the objection thus calling his impartiality into question.
In de Haan the European Court of Human Rights found that there had been a violation of
Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the
right to a fair trial), when a judge presided over an appeals tribunal called upon to decide on an
objection against a ruling for which he was responsible. Furthermore the Central Appeals
Tribunal refused to quash the proceedings based upon the composition of the original appeals
tribunal, and therefore guarantee impartiality. Thus the Central Appeals Tribunal did not cure the
possible impartiality based upon the composition of the court consequently violating Article 6.19
The De Haan case points out that impartiality may be measured both subjectively and
objectively and must be measured both ways. Subjectively impartiality must be evaluated on a
case by case basis; possible connections of the parties to the court, the situation being tried, etc..
In war crimes tribunals this could involve the connections of the accused to the judiciary.
Objectively impartiality must be measured using extant mechanisms created to prevent
impartiality, such as rules and procedures. Furthermore the court suggests that the scope of
review in an appeals mechanism may make reparation possible for a violation of Article 6 even if

19

De Haan v. The Netherlands, Judgement of 26 of August 1997, 26 EHRR 417. [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 1]
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that was not the case for de Haan.20
The idea that biased trial could remedied by court mechanisms is the main point in de
Haan. Therefore if there were measurable political interference in the ECCC, objective or
subjective, which would be a violation of the accused’s right to a fair trial, then an appeals
mechanism could be used to combat that partiality, such as a separate chamber for appeals or a
system for evaluating complaints of impartiality.
C. Extant Mechanisms That Alleviate Political Pressure Upon the Judiciary of the
ECCC
In 1997 the UN was asked in a letter from the Prime Minister of Cambodia, to assist in
the prosecution of the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, because Cambodia did not have the
experience to handle trying crimes of this magnitude. However because of the aforementioned21
tension between Cambodia and the UN, both parties have attempted to implement mechanisms to
alleviate any possible appearance of political pressure or interference.
1. The International Standards Adopted into the ECCC
The court, formed as a royal decree by the King of Cambodia and “taking into account
the request of the Prime Minister” state in Article 10:
The judges of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be appointed from among the currently
practicing judges or are additionally appointed in accordance with the existing procedures
for appointment of judges; all of whom shall have high moral character, a spirit of
impartiality and integrity, and experience, particularly in criminal law or international
law including international humanitarian law and human rights law. Judges shall be
independent in the performance of their functions, and shall not accept or seek any
instructions from any government or other source.22
Both the Prime Minister and the King of Cambodia have accepted these[?] written rules
20

21

22

Id. at para. 53.
See supra note 4.

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 2011. Internal Rules. 3 August. [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 3]
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indicating that judges ought to be impartial. Furthermore Article 12 (2) states:
The Extraordinary Chambers shall exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with
international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as set out in Articles 14
and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which
Cambodia is a party.23
These rules were adopted at the behest of both the Prime Minister and the King. Furthermore, the
UN implemented additional mechanisms to prevent and remedy the possibility of political
interference.
2.

Mechanisms to Prevent Political Interference

a.

Super-majority Rule

A super-majority requirement for Court action was put into place in order to address the
potential impact of government interference because of the inherent structure of the court with its
Cambodian majority. This rule was a prerequisite for UN participation in a court which has more
Cambodian judges than international judges.24 In the ECCC, any time a decision is made by
judges there must be a super majority. Articles 4 and 7 of the Agreement between the UN and
Cambodia declare that a decision by either the Trial Chamber or Pre-Trial Chamber require the
vote of at least four judges; the composition of those chambers is three Cambodian judges and
two international judges. The Pre-Trial Chamber hears motions and appeals against decisions by
the investigating judges when a case is still under investigation before trial. In the Supreme Court
Chamber, where four of seven judges are Cambodian, a super-majority five out of seven votes is
required for a decision25 In both of these situations, in case the Cambodian judges vote together

23

Id. at 8.

24

John D. Ciorciari & Ann Heindel, at 192. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source
21]
25

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution
Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (Jun. 6, 2003), I-41723
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because of intense political pressure, an international judge is required for a decision to become
effective. This requirement should at least in theory prevent the intense political pressure from
morphing into “interference” by the terms of this memo.
The super-majority rule as a mechanism to prevent political interference is effective;
however the potential for a stalemate (where a super-majority cannot be formed, so no action can
be taken) means that the efficacy of the court is compromised in order to combat possible
injustice. Furthermore even if there are no political reasons for the way votes are cast, there
could be an impasse. Thus the super-majority rule could potentially cause the ECCC problems in
enacting justice.
The “Duch” trial was Case 001, in the ECCC in which Kiang Kek Lev26 was tried for
crimes against humanity, torture, and murder. He was found guilty and sentenced in July 2010.
The decisions27 which were not unanimous during the trial did not fall along international lines
or result in deadlock.28 The analysis of these voting patterns shows the possibility that there was
no political interference during this trial because partisan voting blocs did not arise. This case is
an excellent demonstration of how the super-majority rule may be used to police the possibility
of political interference.29Analyzing voting patterns is a good tool for tracking whether political

UNT.S. 2329. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2]
26

Known as “Duch.”

27

Such as objections to evidence and the charges Duch was guilty of.

Trial Chamber Decision on Civil Party Co-lawyers’ Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party
Lawyers to make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts
and Witnesses Testifying on Character, (October 9, 2009). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source 5]
28

29

See Kristen Ainley, Transitional Justice in Cambodia: The Coincidence of Power and Principle, Cambridge
University Press, (2014), at 24. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 22] “There
have been small successes at the ECCC – the most significant of which is the completion of the trial of Case 001 and
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pressure is becoming political interference, Case 001 shows that the judges of the ECCC resisted
political attempts to influence their work.
b. The Judicial Nomination System
Transparency in general processes and procedures is regarded as a means to maintain a
legitimate and impartial court. A transparent process for the selection of the judiciary is
commonly held as a means for combatting corruption, including political interference. A
transparent selection process is defined by the University College of London as:
[O]ne that clearly identifies the potential candidate pool, is accessible to potential
applications through advertising, publishes criteria and a procedure for its decisionmaking, accepts applications in a set format, assesses candidates consistently against its
criteria, consults with a set range of outside institutions (if appropriate), makes a decision
based on an objective assessment of whether the criteria have been met, and, where
appropriate, provides reasons for the decision.30
The UN has attempted to enact a novel procedure, specifically formulated for the ECCC, for the
selection and nomination of ECCC judges and prosecutors in order to eliminate any possibility
that the judiciary itself was biased:
As part of the UN’s efforts to improve the transparency and quality of selection, the
ECCC was the first court for which it accepted nominations not only from the States,31
but also from anyone else (including self-nominations), which were entered into the
database by OSJI. Also for the first time the judges were interviewed by a panel of
experts, including two ICTY judges and UN Office of Legal Affairs staff. This new
procedure ‘is said to provide a better guarantee than previous mechanisms of the
selection of impartial and professional officials.32
the progress made in Case 002. It remains a possibility that the existence of the ECCC will inspire reform in the
Cambodian judiciary – currently heavily dependent upon the government for patronage and protection, widely seen
as untrustworthy and corrupt and often poorly qualified.”
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Centre for International Courts and Tribunals, University College London, Selecting International Judges:
Principles, Process and Politics, (2008), at 15 (11.1). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive
at Source 24]
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States other than Cambodia and UN members.
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John D. Ciorciari & Ann Heindel, at 192. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source
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This procedure follows the definition provided by the University College of London. The
nominees are interviewed by an outside panel. This panel is composed of people who are experts
in international law. The panel consists in part of ICTY judges; those judges ought to be
impartial. Therefore those panelists should be able to identify potential problems with the
nominees’ partiality.
The ECCC could potentially make the judicial selection process more transparent
by requiring the selection panels to publish criteria for nominees and findings after the interview
process on whether or not the candidates meet the criteria, in keeping with the above University
College London suggestions.
c. The Weighted Dispute Resolution Procedure
Within the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ECCC the chamber must settle disagreements
between the co-prosecutors and the co-investigating judges. The teams of co-prosecutors and coinvestigating judges, as per the internal rules of the court, must include one international member
and one Cambodian member. If the co-investigating judges or co-prosecutors cannot come to an
agreement, then either may file a notice which the Pre-Trial Chamber must resolve utilizing the
super-majority rule discussed above.33 Furthermore the rules of the ECCC state that if the PreTrial Chamber does not reach a super-majority vote to the contrary, then the investigation will go
forward.34 Therefore unless the Pre-Trial Chamber says the case may not go forward the case
will go forward, to prevent inaction from thwarting justice.
21]
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See Section II(C)(2)(A)

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 2011. Internal Rules. 3 August. See also
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 2014. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source 3]
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This rule against inaction is to combat the issues that arise in deciding whether or not to
move forward in an investigation. However while this eradicates certain situations35 that could
arise because of political interference it does not clarify what happens if other issues were to
arise.36 Additionally the internal rules do not discuss any standards that should be applied in
resolving disputes. A suggestion to the ECCC would be to draft such standards for resolving a
dispute between Chambers, such as voting procedures.
d. Provision Allowing the UN to Withdraw
The final mechanism utilized by the UN to prevent political interference in the ECCC by the
Cambodian Government is arguably an attempt by the UN to exert political pressure upon the
Cambodian Government. Article 28 of the Agreement between the UN and Cambodia states:
Should the Royal Government of Cambodia change the structure or organization of the
Extraordinary Chambers or otherwise cause them to function in a manner that does not
conform with the terms of the present Agreement, the United Nations reserves the right to
cease to provide assistance, financial or otherwise, pursuant to the present Agreement.37
This provision amounts to political pressure, in the form of financial pressure, from the UN upon
the government of Cambodia to maintain international standards within the court. This provision
gives the UN a lot of leverage to maintain international legal standards, because the loss of
funding would mean the end of the ECCC.38
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If there were a rule making a Pre-Trial vote necessary to move a case forward, then there could be the potential for
a stalemate and possibly gridlock in the pre-trial phases.
Such as gridlock once a trial moves forward; If the Pre-Trial Chamber couldn’t meet the supermajority rule in
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Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution
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UNT.S. 2329. Article 28. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2]
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para. 45. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 6]
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The withdrawal provision is good for preventing the possibility of Cambodian
interference, but it feels as though the UN is utilizing political pressure of its own. Thus the UN
is using political pressure to prevent political interference from the Cambodian government.
D. Political Pressure is not Always Political Interference
The ECCC has a lot of political pressure upon it because of the nature of its formation and
day to day operation. The ECCC has a variety of mechanisms to combat political interference.
These mechanisms are intended to prevent the trials from becoming unfair, and they go a long
way toward accomplishing that feat. With the withdrawal option that the UN maintains,39
sometimes political pressure is necessary to prevent political interference. As illustrated by the
various examples provided by recent cases40 political pressure upon participants does not
necessarily equate to political interference in outcomes of the trials. Therefore the trials are not
inherently unfair.
The Agreement establishing the ECCC contains measures to prevent interference by the
Cambodian government. If the Cambodian Government decides to interfere with the
proceedings, the court would become independent if the UN decides to withdraw support or be
disbanded due to lack of funding. However this would be counterproductive because it could
damage the legitimacy of the court in prosecuting crimes perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge. The
legitimacy would be damaged because the UN, in its withdrawal, is confirming that the court has
been interfered with by the Cambodian government. The lack of UN participation would also
mean that the court would be run only by Cambodian officials, meaning that political
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supra at note 31.
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See Section III(B).
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interference would be a sure thing.
Legitimacy is a serious concern for international tribunals. Legitimacy is not only dependent
upon the international community but the states’ opinions in the rulings41 are also important in
upholding the rulings. The backing of the state is important because it provides legitimacy to the
ruling. John C. Yoo in his article “Judicial Independence in International Tribunals” argues that
international tribunals, in order to be legitimate in their rulings must “act consistently with the
interests of the states that create them.”42 Therefore, so long as the government of Cambodia is
not interfering in the trials themselves the government should be allowed to have a say in the
court because the crimes in question were perpetrated by their nationals upon their people.
IV. Policy Considerations
With the rising need for international legal proceedings, involving various governments,
political pressure and political interference are a constant presence in the world today. Therefore
an analysis of the benefits and pitfalls of political pressure in an international setting is
consequently beneficial to this document.
A. Potential Problems with Political Pressure
Critics have attacked the ECCC for prioritizing peace over justice.43 However these
critics, the international media, legal experts, states, etc., fail to take into account the current
41
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John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2005), at 72. [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 9]
“We have found no evidence that independent tribunals are more effective than dependent tribunals, and some
evidence that the reverse is true, that independent tribunals are less effective than dependent tribunals. … We argue
that political unification makes independent tribunals possible. In the international realm, where there is no political
unification, international tribunals cannot be both independent and effective. This is not to claim, as some have, that
international tribunals serve no useful purpose. As we have explained, international tribunals can help states resolve
disputes by providing information on the facts or rules of conduct. But they must act consistently with the interests
of the states that create them.”
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Kristen Ainley, at 26. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 22]
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political and social-economic situations in countries that have been subjected to the atrocities
prosecuted in international tribunals. The point of the international war crimes tribunals is to
seek justice. However, states exert political pressure upon their people and the various arms of
governance in order to maintain peace within their countries. There must be a balance, between
state and victim interests, in order for international courts to be sustainable in the future. The
state provides the forum in which victims may seek justice.
Cases 003/004 of the ECCC are what most media outlets point to as an example of the
interference by the Cambodian government on the proceedings of the ECCC. Cases 003/004
focuses upon crimes in specific locations and the suspects remain confidential.44 The
international attention on these crimes and the inability of the Chambers to come to a conclusion,
make the Chambers seem ineffectual and illegitimate. These cases were brought to a standstill
due to disagreements between the judges. Judge Kasper-Ansermet, resigned and claimed that the
co-investigating judges were dysfunctional. 45 Because of the actions of the Cambodian
government (such as public statements and judicial appointments) and the circumstances that
surround these investigations, the international media have painted the ECCC as illegitimate and
corrupt.46 Such media attention a frequent effect of political pressure and it has the potential to
damage the reputation of international courts.

Khmer Rouge Crimes in Legal Limbo. The National.” http://www.thenational.ae/featured-content/latest/khmerrouge-crimes-in-legal-limbo (October 26, 2014). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source 14]
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Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Document No. D114, March 21, 2012.
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 7
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There is an argument that seems prevalent in the current media with regards to political
pressure; that all political pressure is unlawful. If all trials and tribunals were heavily influenced
by the political entities that control them then all judgments would be the will of the government
and not the conclusion of an impartial trier of fact. The legitimacy of the ruling could be called
into question. the last thing that international law needs is its legitimacy further questioned.
B. Potential problems without Political Pressure
Without political pressure international tribunals could not function as they have.
Gweyneth McClendo, writing for Human Rights Review, points out that without government
cooperation international tribunals would not be functional because fewer than ten people have
turned themselves in for prosecution. Furthermore, without government backing most of these
tribunals would not be able to make determinations at all.47
We live in an imperfect world, there will always be political pressure and political
interference; if political pressure is a reason to throw out otherwise legitimate rulings or
procedures, then most of the current court systems across the globe are presenting illegitimate
rulings. There is a colloquialism that states: “Whenever you have three people in a room you
have politics.” The field of international law is no exception. Thus courts must make better
procedures for identifying political pressure and differentiating it from political interference.
Courts must also create better systems for handling the possibility of political interference, such
as appeals systems and internal mechanisms for combatting interference, such as those present in
the ECCC.
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V. Conclusions
In conclusion political pressure does not become political interference unless it is allowed
to dictate the outcomes of a trial. This suggests that not all political pressure results in an
inherently unfair outcome.
Political pressure may be kept in check by various mechanisms, which may or may not
change the efficacy of the judiciary. The effects of political pressure may be mitigated by judicial
decisions, and political interference can be prevented by institutional protocols. Thus political
pressure would be prevented from becoming political interference.
The ECCC has many mechanisms which help to offset the potential for abuse by the
government. These mechanisms were written into the foundations of the Chambers. In practice
they seem to have been effective, although these mechanisms need more time before their
efficacy can be fully evaluated. The ECCC has struggled with allegations that the Cambodian
Government has been improperly meddling with the affairs of the court. Both parties in this
hybrid court have exerted political pressure upon the proceedings and structure of the court, but
political interference has not been proven. Therefore instead of declaring all proceedings to be
unfair, the proceedings should be evaluated for political interference. If there is political
interference the case ought to be retried.
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